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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of the merchant coalition (kabu nakama) in the eighteenth and 
the first half of the nineteenth century in Japan, from the standpoint of Historical Institutional Analysis 
(Greif[1997, 1998]). Quantitative economic history literature has made clear that market-based 
economic growth started around the end of the eighteenth century in Japan. On the other hand, the 
Bakufu, the central government, repeatedly promulgated Aitai Sumeshi Rei  (Mutual Settlement 
Decree), prescribing that the public authorities would not accept suits on pecuniary affairs. This 
implies that the public system for third-party enforcement was not working well. 
Activities of the merchant coalition substituted for the public third-party enforcement. Many 
of the merchant coalitions’ codes wrote that all of each coalition’s members should suspend 
transaction with those who cheated any one of the members of the coalition.  This was the multilateral 
punishment strategy (MPS), formulated by Greif[1993]. It is hypothesized that kabu nakama played 
the role of contract enforcement using the MPS, which reduced incentives for the transaction 
counterparts to cheat, and thereby promoted a market economy.   
                                                       
Also, this paper empirically examines this hypothesis, using an opportunity of a natural 
experiment. In 1841, the Bakufu prohibited the coalition, intending to eliminate monopoly. The above 
hypothesis implies that prohibition of the coalition lowered the performance of the market economy.  
As predicted, we found that the growth rate of the real money supply contracted, that the efficiency of 
price arbitrage declined, and that inflation rate went up. 
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meeting of the Socio-economic History Society, the seminars at The University of Tokyo and 
Yokohama National University. Detailed comments of the anonymous referees and the editor of 
Explorations in Economic History were very helpful. Of course, all errors are author’s responsibility. 
  1Introduction 
In this paper we reexamine the role of kabu nakama, a coalition of merchants or artisans, in 
Japanese economic development in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century 
(hereafter, the Edo Era).  We have three clusters of the literature relating to the theme. The first one is 
the methodological literature on the institutional analysis of economic history.  North and 
Thomas[1973] and North[1990, 1991] stressed the role of institutions, especially the public 
institutions for protecting property rights, as a prerequisite for modern economic development. Based 
on this view, and collaborating with the economists developing the Institutional Analysis (Aoki[1998, 
2001]; Hayami and Aoki eds.[1998]), Greif[1989, 1993, 1997, 2002] substantially expanded the 
scope of the institutional analysis of economic history. He developed the methodology of Historical 
Institutional Analysis (HIA), which analyzes the mechanism for private institutions to be 
self-enforcing, using a game-theoretic framework. 
The second cluster is the literature on the Japanese economic development in the Edo Era.  
This literature has made clear that the Edo society was based on a developed market economy. The 
quantitative economic history literature since the 1970s has provided rich evidences on the 
development of a market economy (Crawcour and Yamamura[1970]; Duffy and Yamamura[1971]; 
Crawcour[1974]; Smith[1973]; Sinbo[1978]; Okura and Shinbo[1978]; Hanley[1983]; 
Yasuba[1987]; Sinbo and Saito[1989]; Ito[1993]; Wakita[1996]). Meanwhile, Iwahashi[1988] 
examined the institutional basis of the economic development in the Edo Era, using North’s 
framework.  He stressed that institutions supporting the economic development existed in the Edo Era, 
including the stable political regime, the land tax system providing peasants with production 
incentives, the unified weights and measures, and the regulation dividing the people into classes of 
peasants, merchants and artisans. 
Contribution of Iwahashi[1988], which focused on the institutional aspect of the premodern 
Japanese economic development, cannot be exaggerated, but on the other hand, Iwahashi [1988] does 
not pay attention to the third party enforcement of contracts by the public authorities, which is an 
essential point of the North’s framework. As we discuss in Section 2, the public system for contract 
enforcement had a serious flaw in Edo Era. The coexistence of the stable economic development and 
week public contract enforcement in the Edo Era is a puzzle, given North’s framework.  We intend to  
resolve this puzzle. 
The third cluster of the literature is that on kabu nakama. We suppose that kabu nakama is the 
key to resolve the puzzle.  There is a classic book on kabu nakama by Mataji Miyamoto, in which he 
wrote that “the intermediate organizations, such as kabu nakama, could exist only on the condition 
that the state or the public authorities were not well developed”, that “in pre-modern Japan, the 
statutory commercial law had not yet been legislated and the formal commercial rules did not exist”, 
and that “the commercial customs of kabu nakama were the only standards for trade, and not only did 
  2the Bakufu’s court refer to the customs, but also each kabu nakama itself resolved commercial 
conflicts” (Miyamoto[1938], pp.151–152).  It is remarkable that as early as in the 1930s, 
Miyamoto[1938] pointed out that private organizations played the role of contract enforcers in a 
society in which the public system of third party enforcement was incomplete
1. 
In this paper, following Miyamoto[1938], we examine the contract enforcement function of 
kabu nakama, based on the framework of the Historical Institutional Analysis. We intend not only to 
present a new hypothesis on the function of kabu nakama, but also to test the hypothesis empirically. 
As stated later, the Bakufu prohibited and dissolved kabu nakama in 1842.  This historical event can 
be regarded as a natural experiment for testing the role of kabu nakama.  Using this opportunity, we 
examine the contract-enforcement hypothesis of kabu nakama with quantitative data, as well as with 
descriptive materials. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we provide an overview of the economic 
development and the legal system in Edo Era Japan, from which we derive the puzzle mentioned 
above.  In Section 3, we examine the codes of kabu nakama, and present the contract enforcement 
hypothesis of kabu nakama.  In Section 4, we test the hypothesis, focusing on the natural experiment 
after 1842.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Economic development and legal system in Edo Era: An overview 
(1) Development of the market economy 
Akashi[1989], one of the quantitative researches on Edo Era Japan, focused on the macro 
aspect of economic development.  He measured the economic growth from 1725 to 1856, based on an 
original estimation of the real money supply, and found that while there was no trend in the real money 
supply until 1790, since then an upward trend emerged.  The average annual growth rate of the real 
money supply was around 0.7% (Figure 1)
2.  He interpreted the growth of the real money supply as a 
measure of economic growth, assuming that the Marshallian k was constant over time.  Although the 
assumption of a constant k is restrictive, if we accept it, the implications of this finding are 
remarkable
3. 
                                                        
1 Concerning the literature on the kabu nakama in the postwar period, see Imai[1989] and 
Iwabushi[1994].  In the 1960s and early 1970s, the researches on kabu nakama focused on its role as a 
part of the political regime in the Edo Era (Tsuda[1961]; Hayashi[1967]; Nakai[1971]).  In recent 
years, many researches have focused on the kabu nakama as a social group composing the city 
community (Yoshida[1985]; Imai[1989]).  On the other hand, we intend to shed new light on the 
economic aspects of the kabu nakama, which Miyamoto[1938] explored in the prewar period. 
2 Here money refers to the metal money issued by Bakufu. 
3 Commercialization and financial development would raise k .  So, the real money supply is an index 
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has been proposed by other quantitative economic history researches.  At the same time, it implies that 
the starting point of the growth was not around 1820 as is widely accepted, but around 1790 
(Akashi[1989] pp.47–48)
4.  The fact that economic growth started around 1790 is significant for us, 
because it coincides with the so called Tanuma Period, when Roju (the head of the Bakufu 
bureaucracy) Okitsugu Tanuma implemented a policy promoting kabu nakama. 
Besides the macro aspect, rich literature has made clear that the Edo society was a society with a 
developed market economy.  It is well known that the commerce in Edo Era was based on credit 
(Shinbo[1957]pp.116-117; Miyamoto[1961] p.61; Fujita, Miyamoto and Hasegawa[1978] 
pp.112–113).  Significance of the credit in trade can be illustrated by an example of Hasegawa, a 
major cotton wholesaler in Edo (Kitajima ed[1962] p.182). Hasegawa stocked cotton clothes from the 
buyers in several cotton weaving areas.  For this purpose, Hasegawa sent money to the buyers in those 
areas in advance.  In 1705, the credit given to the buyers was 22% of Hasegawa’s  total asset. 
Iwahashi[1981] and Miyamoto[1988] examined the efficiency of the market mechanism, 
focusing on the price arbitrage between the local rice markets.  Miyamoto[1988] calculated 
correlation coefficients of the growth rates of rice prices in five regions, namely Edo, Osaka, Nagoya, 
Hiroshima and Aizu, and found that the coefficients increased from 0.57 in the second half of the 
seventeenth century to 0.72 in the first half of the nineteenth century (Table 1).  Miyamoto[1988] also 
calculated correlation coefficients using the data of twelve local rice markets
5.  In this case, while an 
upward trend of the coefficients was not observed, the coefficients were as large as around 0.7 in the 
eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century.  These results imply that price arbitrage worked 
fairly well among the local rice markets. 
On the other hand, Ito[1993] and Wakita[1996] tested the efficiency of the rice market using a 
more sophisticated methodology.  As is well known, the Dojima Rice Exchange in Osaka was one of 
the earliest futures markets in the world (Duffie[1989]).  The Dojima Rice Exchange was equipped 
with a system of cash settlement of rice futures as well as a membership system. Rice futures were 
traded during a certain period.  Ito[1993] tested econometrically whether the futures price on the first 
day of the trading period was an unbiased estimator of the price on the last day of the period, as 
predicted by the efficient market hypothesis.  Ito[1993] obtained a result that rejected the efficient 
                                                                                                                                                                    
which reflects wider aspects of economic development  
4 Quantitative economic history literature has supposed that the inflation in the 1820s and 1830s 
started the sustainable economic growth by reducing the real wage rate (Shimbo[1978]; 
Umemura[1981]; Miyamoto[1989]). 
5 Besides the above five regions, Banshu, Fukuchiyama, Bocho, Saga, Kumamoto, Shinshu and Dewa 
are included. 
  4market hypothesis. Wakita[1996] retested the hypothesis, splitting the data by season, to have a result 
that the efficient market hypothesis could not be rejected for the spring and autumn markets. 
 
(2) Legal system 
Assuming a developed market economy in the Edo Era on one hand and North’s framework on 
the other, we naturally expect that a public system for contract enforcement worked well.  However, 
this was not the case. The legal system in the Edo Era has been investigated in the legal history 
literature (Ishii[1960]; Henderson [1965]; Takigawa[1985]; Maki and Fujiwara[1995]). As in the 
modern legal system, law suits were classified into the criminal affairs (ginmi suji) and the civil affairs 
(deiri suji), and their legal procedures were different between these two categories. Concerning a 
criminal affair, whether there was an accusation or not, the Bakufu authorities arrested the criminals 
and placed them before the court.  On the other hand, with respect to a civil affair, the process of 
justice was initiated by a suit by the plaintiff (Fujiwara and Maki[1995] p.233). Hereafter, we focus 
mainly on civil affairs. 
Civil affairs were further classified into three subcategories, namely honkuji (main suits) 
kanekuji (money suits) and nakamagoto (mutual affairs). Kanekuji was a suit concerning credit with 
interest and credit without collateral.  Nakamagoto was a suit concerning distribution of profit within 
a private organization.  Honkuji was a civil suit other than kanekuji and nakamagoto.  It is remarkable 
that the above classification corresponded to the solidity of the protection of the plaintiffs’ claims.  
The claims most rigidly protected by the Bakufu authorities were the claims concerning honkuji, while 
the other extreme was nakamagoto. Regarding nakamagoto, in principle, the Bakufu authorities did 
not accept a suit, on the grounds that it should be resolved within the organization. Kanekuji lay in 
between, and protection of the plaintiff’s claims was relatively weak, compared with those concerning 
honkuji (Henderson[1965] pp.106-116; Maki and Fujiwara[1995] pp.241-242). 
The weakness of the plaintiff’s claims concerning kanekuji was reflected in Aitai Sumashi Rei, 
(Mutual Settlement Decree), prescribing that the Bakufu authorities would not accept kanekuji suits.  
In Edo City, Aitai Sumashi Rei were promulgated in 1622, 1661, 1663, 1682, 1685, 1702, 1719, 1746, 
1789, 1797 and 1842, which means that those decrees were not exceptional.  Those decrees, except 
that in 1719, applied to all claims before the promulgation of the decree.  The decree of 1719 applied 
to future claims as well, until it was repealed in 1729 (Henderson[1965] p.107). Aitai Sumashi Rei did 
not deny the claim itself, but it is remarkable that the Bakufu authorities from time to time suspended 
enforcement of contracts. North’s framework cannot consistently explain this fact and the highly 
developed market economy based on credit.  As mentioned in Section 1, we suppose that the key to 
resolving this puzzle is kabu nakama. 
 
3. Organization and function of kabu nakama 
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business license granted by the public authorities. That license and therefore the organization of kabu 
nakama was regional, for example in Edo or in Osaka.  In many cases, the grant of kabu was based on 
application by a group of merchants or artisans. Usually kabu was embodied in a wooden card, and 
was an object of inheritance, loan, pawn and trade.  If a member of kabu nakama intended to sell his 
kabu, he should have approvals of all of the other members. Each kabu nakama had a members’ 
meeting (yoriai) as an organization for decision making, and a manager (gyoji) as its executive 
(Miyamoto[1938] chapter 2, 3).  Numbers of the members were different from nakama to nakama, but 
we can infer the approximate scale by the following data.  Higaki Kaisen Tsumi Ton’ya Nakama was 
a league of major kabu nakama in Edo.  In 1813 it was composed of 63 kabu nakama.  The members of 
those nakama distributed from 1 to 113, and the average was 30.7
6.    
Kabu nakama emerged in the seventeenth century.  In the early seventeenth century, the 
Bakufu prohibited the private collusion of merchants and artisans, following the policy prohibiting 
coalitions (za) by Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who unified the nation for the first time after the Muromachi 
Bakufu lost power in the late fifteenth century.  However, its policy started to change in the middle of 
the seventeenth century.  As a part of the Kyoho Reform in the early eighteenth century, the Bakufu 
adopted a policy promoting kabu nakama for the purpose of controlling prices and distribution.  
Moreover, as mentioned in Section 2, during the Tanuma Period in the 1770s and the 1780s, the 
Bakufu promoted kabu nakama still more actively to collect taxes, as well as to expand commerce 
(Duffy and Yamamura[1971] p.397; Inoue et al.[1988] p.823). 
Miyamoto[1938] classified the functions of kabu nakama into four categories, namely, 
monopoly, protection of interest, coordination, and maintenance of reputation.  Included in the 
categories of protection of interest and maintenance of reputation is the function of contract 
enforcement on which we focus here.  For example, “The Code of Salt Wholesale Merchants” (1741) 
prescribed that “If a broker cheats one of the members of the kabu nakama concerning the salt price, 
all of the nakama members should promise to suspend trade with the broker who cheated.”   
Interestingly enough, the mode of conduct prescribed in the Code was essentially the same as 
the multilateral punishment strategy (MPS), which Greif[1993] formulated regarding the coalition of 
Maghribis traders in medieval Mediterranean society. As Greif[1993] showed, if the MPS was an 
equilibrium of the game, a cheating agent would lose future profit from trade not only with the cheated 
merchant himself but also with all of the other members of the coalition. Therefore, the agent would 
choose to be honest rather than to cheat for a single gain. 
The cases in which kabu nakama adopted the MPS regarding commercial trade were not 
                                                        
6 Calculated from Table 43 of Hayashi[1967](p.43).  One kabu nakama whose number of members is 
not available is excluded from the average.  
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not available, but Miyamoto[1938] cited many codes of kabu nakama.  Among those codes, we can 
find eleven cases prescribing the MPS concerning commercial trade. Each of them prescribes that all 
the nakama members should suspend commercial trade with the counterpart who cheated one of the 
nakama members. As a cheating to be punished, nine of the eleven codes concerned non-payment of 
the price of the commodities which were sold and delivered in advance.  This reflects the fact that the 
credit was widely used in market transactions.  Besides non-payment of the price, non-payment of 
commission, non-delivery of the commodity and the provision of a poor quality commodity were 
regarded as cheating. 
Kabu nakama applied this strategy not only to commodity trade, but also to organizing 
production, namely to managing the putting-out system. The putting-out system has been supposed to 
play a major role in the weaving industry in Edo Era Japan
7. On the other hand, Landes [1969] 
examined the putting out system in the textile industry from a comparative institutional standpoint, 
and pointed out that embezzlement of yarns was its inherent problem
8.  The relationship between a 
weaver and subcontractors can be regarded as a typical agency relationship with asymmetric 
information, and the weaver was always faced with the possibility of embezzlement by the 
subcontractors. Therefore, without a certain mechanism for overcoming this problem, the putting out 
system would not work.  We suppose that in Edo Era Japan the mechanism was provided by kabu 
nakama. 
Let us look at the case of the silk weaving industry in Kiryu, where production was mainly 
organized by the putting out system. The silk weaving industry in Kiryu was started in the early 
eighteenth century.  It is remarkable that kabu nakama began to be organized almost at the same time, 
                                                        
7 The role of the putting out system in the cotton weaving industry in Edo Era Japan is reflected in the 
vicissitudes of the local production places.  Abe[1988] found important insights by compiling the 
information in the local histories and the histories of local industrial associations.  First, in many areas, 
production of weavings to sell started after the latter half of the eighteenth century, and the Tanuma 
Period was the most important epoch in the development of the cotton weaving industry.  Second, the 
new production areas that emerged after the latter half of the eighteenth century developed faster than 
the older areas, and in many of those new areas the putting out system was used.  These findings 
suggest that the putting out system brought about the development of the new production areas after 
the latter half of the eighteenth century.  Moreover, the second finding is remarkable, because the 
Tanuma Period was the heyday of kabu nakama as mentioned above. 
8 Embezzling in the putting out system was observed also in early twentieth-century Japan.  
Abe[1989] reports that the subcontracting weavers cheated the entrusting weavers through the 
embezzling of yarn and default on obligations in the Osaka area (pp.203-204). 
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Editorial Committee of the History of Kiryu Weavings[1935] pp.360–361). The Code of the Weaver 
Nakama in 1824 prescribed that “If a spinner or a subcontracting weaver returns products containing 
less yarns than the weaver supplied, the price of the yarns deficit should be subtracted from the 
payment to the spinner or the subcontracting weaver.  If cheating occurs, the nakama member should 
report it to the nakama manager.  In this case, all of the nakama members should not entrust yarns or 
weaving machines to the cheater.”     
The case of the Kiryu Weaver Nakama is remarkable in the following senses.  First, the 
problem it aimed to resolve was the embezzlement of yarns, which Landes[1969] regarded as the 
inherent problem of the putting out system.  Second, the Kiryu Weaver Nakama adopted the strategy 
that all of the members should suspend entrusting yarns and weaving machines to a subcontractor who 
cheated one of the nakama members.  In other words, they applied the MPS to resolve the inherent 
problem of the putting-out system. A similar example concerning the putting out system is found in 
Osaka.  The code of the Seven Nakama of Wool and Cotton prescribed that “The cloth dyeing should 
be entrusted to the members of a certain dyeing artisan nakama.  If an artisan cheats one of our 
members, the Seven Nakama should agree not to entrust dyeing to the artisan, and this measure should 
be written down by each of our members.” 
Furthermore, kabu nakama adopted the MPS to cope with the cheating inside the firm. Some 
weavers in Kiryu directly employed workers in their workshops, besides subcontractors under the 
putting out system. With respect to these employees, the above mentioned Code in 1824 prescribed 
that “If a male employee, a female employee, or a temporary worker cheats one of the members, and it 
cannot be ignored, the cheated member should report it to the nakama manager.  We should write the 
cheater’s name on the black list, and never employ him or her.”  
Examples of the MPS concerning employment relationships are found also in the codes of the 
merchant nakama. The Code of the Rice and Exchange Nakama in 1751 prescribed that “If a member 
discharges a servant, a sales clerk or a shop boy because of cheating, he should announce it to the other 
members.  The nakama members should not employ the cheater, even if the ex-employer has no 
objection to do so.”  Miyamoto[1938] interpreted that this prescription aimed to prevent from draining 
the confidential code, skill, knowledge and the ex-employer’s relationships with customers.  This 
interpretation is reflected in the fact that Miyamoto[1938] classified these cases in the category of 
coordination rather than protection of interest.  It is true that concerning some kabu nakama his 
interpretation is correct, because they prescribed that the other members could employ the dismissed 
employee, if the ex-employer approved.  However, in cases where re-employment was prohibited 
whether the ex-employer approved or not, like the Rice and Exchange Nakama mentioned above, the 
reason cannot be to avoid leakage of knowledge.  It is more appropriately interpreted as the MPS. The 
MPS is clearly observed in the case of the Code of Domestic Raw Indigo Broker Nakama.  It 
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employee was dismissed peacefully, the members could employ him after inquiries to the ex-employer.  
Those cases indicate that kabu nakama played the role of supporting the employment relationship 
through the MPS.   
An important question is how pervasive the MPS was as a punishment strategy in kabu 
nakama.  It is difficult to answer this question, because a comprehensive survey of kabu nakama codes 
is not available, but some conjecture is possible.  In 1868, just after the Meiji Restoration, the new 
government dissolved kabu nakama.  Ten years later, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce proposed to 
promote commercial and industrial associations, in order to resolve commercial disorder after the 
Restoration.  For this purpose, the Osaka Chamber of Commerce made a model code of associations in 
1882.  In the model code, the MPS for a cheating employee was included (Miyamoto[1976] 
pp.815-824).  It suggests that the MPS was widely accepted as a governance mechanism at least of the 
employment relation.     
Also, it is important to check whether the MPS was an equilibrium under the actual conditions 
in Edo Era Japan. Greif[1993] showed that the MPS is a subgame-perfect equilibrium under certain 
conditions, using an efficiency wage model. One of the conditions is that the probability that an 
unemployed honest agent will be rehired is not lower than the probability that an unemployed cheater 
will be rehired.  If this condition holds, under the setting of Greif[1993], the optimal wage, namely the 
wage for which it is an agent’s best response to play honest, is lower for an unemployed honest agent 
than an unemployed cheater, and hence the members who were not cheated will not hire the cheater. 
The difference of the optimal wages between an honest agent and a cheater is larger, if the difference 
of the probability of rehire between the two types of agents are larger, if the probability of an 
exogenous discharge is lower, if the outside option of an agent is lower, and if the discount factor is 
larger.  
Referring to the Greif model, first we can point out that with respect to kabu nakama, the 
number of the players of the game were limited.  As mentioned above, the average number of kabu 
nakama members were around 30.  Also, the numbers of the transaction counterparts were limited, 
because they were brokers, employees and subcontractors, and not mass consumers. This condition 
made it easy to monitor the counterparts and identify cheaters. Second, there were information 
transmission mechanisms for delivering the information on cheating to all the members of the nakama.  
Many of the nakama codes include clauses concerning this issue.  The kabu nakama members shared 
the information on cheating by circulating a letter (Indigo Brokers), by registration (Firewood 
Wholesale Merchants, Wool and Cotton Brokers, Bowl, Basket and Turnery Artisans), and by 
publication (Firewood Wholesale Merchant).  In many cases, the nakama managers (gyoji) played the 
role of mediators of information transmission (Wool and Cotton Brokers, Bowl, Basket and Turnery 
Artisans, Indigo Brokers).  These two conditions, arguably, contributed to lower the probability that a 
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Third, an honest counterpart could expect to continue transaction for a long time. Concerning 
this point, we can refer to Hayashi[1967], which examined the stocking of Kashiwaya, a major cotton 
wholesaler in Edo, in detail.  In the middle of the seventeenth century, Kashiwaya expanded the areas 
to stock cotton clothes.  Meanwhile, the number of the transaction counterparts, buyers of cotton 
clothes, increased.  Since the 1770s and the 1780s, the number of the transaction counterparts of 
Kashiwaya became stable around 25.  The membership of them was also stable, and Kashiwaya 
continued to stock from them until the end of Edo Era (p.121).   
  Finally, the outside options of the transaction counterparts were low, because kabu nakama had 
the privilege to monopolize a certain business in a certain area.  Because a cheater could hardly find 
counterparts of trade other than nakama members due to the privilege, they should have expected 
substantial loss of future profit from the MPS. In this sense, it is worth stressing that the contract 
enforcement function of kabu nakama, on which we focus in this paper, was related to the monopoly 
function, which has been focused by a lot of historical literature including Miyamoto[1938], 
Tsuda[1961] and Hayashi[1967].    
It is a separate issue for the MPS to be an equiliblium and to be selected among possible 
equilibria. Why the MPS was selected as an equilibrium in Edo Era Japan, as in the society of 
Maghribis traders (Greif[1994]) ?  To address this question, we should take into account of historical 
path dependence.  As mentioned above, the origin of kabu nakama is za in Medieval Japan.  Za was a 
group of merchants and artisans, which was affiliated to a powerful aristocrat, temple or shrine 
(Miyamoto[1938] p.3-9; Wakita[1969]p.253).  Arguably, the experience of za gave a collectivist focal 
point.  Also, kabu nakama inherited a religious element from za.  In many cases, members of each 
kabu nakama believed a common religion and they cooperated for the religious festivals, which 
strengthened the tie of kabu nakama (Miyamoto[1938] p.106).       
 
4. Empirical examination of the function of kabu nakama: The Tempo Reform as a natural 
experiment 
The Bakufu, which promoted kabu nakama in the eighteenth century, changed its policy in the 
1840s. In the early nineteenth century, the Bakufu, whose major revenue source was a tax paid in 
terms of rice, came to be in financial difficulties, mainly because of the stagnation in the price of rice 
and the rise of other commodities’ prices. The Roju Tadakuni Mizuno started the Tenpo Reform in 
1841 to resolve this problem. As a part of the Reform, the Bakufu prohibited kabu nakama, because it 
regarded  kabu nakama as a major cause of the inflation (Duffy and Yamamura[1971] p.399; 
Fujita[1989] pp.146–147). To put it concretely, the Bakufu not only abolished kabu (business license), 
but it also punished those who made collusion like kabu nakama (Koda[1928]pp.360-368). However, 
the prohibition was subsequently withdrawn in 1851 by the reason explained below (Miyamoto[1938] 
  10pp.337–343)
9. 
We can test the function of kabu nakama by comparing the economy in the period from 1842 
to 1851, when kabu nakama was prohibited, with the economy before that period. From the 
hypothesis presented in the previous section that the kabu nakama played the role of enforcing 
contract, we have the implication that the prohibition of kabu nakama would cause disorder and 
contraction of trade. By confronting this implication with the actual data, we can test the above 
hypo
h credit (Miyamoto[1938] pp.195-201).  That is why credit crunch occurred after the 
prohi
al of the prohibition of kabu nakama in 1851 was the result of the Bakufu’s 
accep
harge of weavers and weaving in Nishijin, the center of 
                                                       
thesis. 
Miyamoto[1938] wrote that as a result of the kabu nakama prohibition, production decreased, 
the distribution system went into disorder, and a credit crunch occurred.  The evidence he relied on 
was a memorandum of the governor of Edo (Edo Machi Bugyo) Kagemoto Toyama in 1848.  In the 
memorandum, Toyama wrote that while the kabu was abolished, credit became difficult to obtain, 
prices did not fall, and the people became still more distressed (p.330).  In the Edo Era, most of the 




Also, the governor of Osaka (Osaka Machi Bugyo) Masayuki Abe wrote “Since kabu nakama 
was prohibited and the people have become able to trade every commodity freely, trade has become 
disorganized, prices have been unstable, and monitoring has become difficult.  Consequently, 
commodities have become unevenly distributed, local provinces are faced with inconvenience as to 
everyday goods, and it is possible to influence on the distribution to Edo” (Kawaura[1959] 
p.130–131). The withdraw
ting these opinions. 
In 1856, after the withdrawal of the prohibition, the Bakufu made bureaucrats (Shoshiki Gakari 
Myoshu)
11 investigate the influence of the prohibition, and found that the distribution system was 
substantially malfunctioning during the prohibition period (Honjo[1931]).  In addition, Honjo[1931] 
cited the following petition of the authority in c
 
9 However, this measure did not completely restore the regime before 1841 in the following respects.  
First, the Bakufu did not issue the wooden card that certified the business privilege (kabu fuda), and 
did not collect tax (myogakin) from kabu nakama.  Second, the Bakufu instructed kabu nakama to 
approve new memberships on request, and not to restrict their membership without an obvious reason 
(Miyamoto[1938] pp.324-338). 
10 Another reason of credit crunch relating to kabu nakama was, kabu was used as a collateral for 
credit (Miyamoto[1938] p.318). 
11 The Monitors of the Commodity Prices were appointed from the city managers (myoshu) by the 
Bakufu in 1843 (Koda[1928] p.373). 
  11traditional silk weaving in Kyoto (pp.47–48): 
 
s learn dishonest manipulation, which will damage the reputation of the 
specialty of Nishijin. 
 of transactions 
in the
a.  In order to avoid these problems, it is desirable to test the hypothesis using sectoral or macro 
data.  




Nishijin weavings have been the most famous specialty of this region.  However, in recent years, 
not only weavers but also people engaged in the distribution of yarns have been beset by 
difficulties. Consequently, the traditional discipline has waned, and some weavers sell scamped 
products, which has influenced on the weavers who keep the traditional discipline. The 
undisciplined weavers might scamp important weavings including those for Bakufu use.  In 
particular, weavers who entered the industry after the prohibition of kabu nakama and do not 
have serious intention
 
This document indicates that the prohibition of kabu nakama damaged the governance
 Nishijin area, and, together with the materials above, supports our hypothesis. 
Although a straightforward test is difficult, we can examine the hypothesis by some 
quantitative data. Figure 2 shows the sales of the Edo branch of Echigoya, a kimono shop managed by 
Mitsui Family. The sales declined sharply in 1842, just after the prohibition of kabu nakama, and 
stagnated at a low level after that.  It is apparent that a structural change took place between 1841 and 
1842.  However, the sales by a certain enterprise might reflect influences specific to it, and especially 
in this case there might be a bias that Echigoya had enjoyed the privilege of being a member of a kabu 
nakam
For this purpose, we first focus on the real money supply data, referred to in Figure 1.  Here, as 
a deflator, we use the average of the price indices in Edo and Osaka, explained below.  Figure 3 shows 
the growth rate of real money supply and the famine index of Akashi[1989]. Akashi[1989] 
constructed this index, which classifies the agricultural harvest of each year into five categories, from 
“famine” (4) to “good harvest” (0), based on Mukoyama[1917] and Society Section of Education 
Department, Tokyo Prefecture[1975]. The index was 4 in 1836 and 1837, which are well known for 
the serious Tempo Famine. In a society like Edo Japan that depends heavily upon agriculture, supply 
shocks due to natural conditions might cause substa
e index in order to control those supply shocks. 
While the average growth rates of the real money supply in the period when kabu nakama was 
prohibited (1842–1850) was -0.28%, in the nine-year period just before the prohibition (1833–1841), 
it grew at the rate of -0.40% per year on average.  Although the growth rate of real money supply was 
almost the same, but the period before the prohibition includes the two famine years whose
 was 4.  On the other hand, the period before the prohibition included no famine years. 
We check this result more formally by regressing the growth rate of real money supply on a 
  12dummy variable, which equals to 1 if kabu nakama was prohibited in the year, and 0 otherwise 
(PROHIB), a dummy variable which equals to 1 if the famine index was 4 in the year, and 0 otherwise 
(FAMINE￿), a time trend (TIME), and a constant.  The expected sign of the two dummy variables are 
negative. Table 2 shows the result of an ordinary least squares regression.  Observation years are from 
1831 to 1852, just before General Perry came to Japan. The coefficients of PROHIB and FAMINE￿
are negative and statistically significant at 5% level. In addition, the absolute value of the coefficient 
of PROHIB is 0.0718, which means that the growth rate of the real money supply was 7.18% lower in 
the period when kabu nakama was prohibited than in the other period. Instead of the famine dummy, 
we can use famine index directly (FAMINE￿). While significance level is slightly lower than 10% 
(p-value=0.117), the sign of FAMINE￿ is negative and its absolute value is substantial.  Also, in case 
we exclude time trend ,which is not significant, the coefficient of Famine￿ becomes significant at 
10% level.  
The decline of economic performance in the period of kabu nakama prohibition is confirmed 
from another standpoint.  As stated in Section 2, correlations of the prices in different regional markets 
have been used to measure the development of the market economy of the Edo Era. On the other hand, 
the kabu nakama, arguably supported market transactions, especially transactions based on credit, 
using the MPS.  Shinbo and Hasegawa[1988] pointed out that kabu nakama of merchants trading soy 
sauce from other regions was established in Kyoto in 1780, which formed a distribution system for the 
soy sauce from the other regions and brought about soy sauce production in Tatsuno (pp.262-263). 
This is an example indicating that kabu nakama contributed to form a distribution network. If kabu 
nakama supported the distribution network, we expect that the correlations of the prices in different 
regional market would decline in the period of kabu nakama prohibition.  Focusing on the price 
correlations is also useful to discriminate between the contract-enforcement function and the 
conve
denotes the price indices in Edo and Osaka
12.  It is observed that while they were very closely 
ntional monopoly hypothesis.   
Concerning the price correlations, Shinbo[1982] pointed out that the trend of the relative price 
in Osaka, compared with the price in Edo, substantially changed around 1840 (p.11), although he did 
not focus on the role of kabu nakama. While Shinbo[1982] used the price index of a five years moving 
average, it is appropriate to use the original series for the purpose of this paper. So we compile a new 
price index by the same method using the original sources on which Shinbo[1982] relied, namely 
Kin’yu Kenkyukai ed.[1937], Mitsui Bunko ed.[1952], and Miyamoto ed.[1963].  The commodities 
included are unpolished rice, polished rice, barley, soybeans, raw cotton, wax, muscovado, bean paste, 
soy sauce, and sake.  The weight is 0.30 for unpolished rice and 0.07 for the other items.  Figure 4 
                                                        
12 Due to the data availability, Shinbo[1982] substituted the prices concerning bean paste, soy sauce,
sake and polished rice in Kyoto for those in Osaka, and converted them into prices in terms of gold 
 
  13correlated until the early 1840s, the correlation subsequently declined.  The correlation coefficient 
was 0.961 in the period from 1833 to 1841, while it was 0.788 in the period from 1842 to 1850. 
Focusing on the rice price, we can perform a similar test for many areas including Edo and 
Osaka.  Iwahashi[1981] compiled time series of the rice prices for Osaka, Omi, Banshu, Fukuchiyama, 
Hiroshima, Bocho, Saga, Kumamoto, Edo, Nagoya, Shinshu, Aizu and Dewa.  The series from Osaka 
to Kumamoto are in terms of silver, while the others are in terms of gold.  We converted the series in 
terms of silver into ones in terms of gold, using the gold price in Osaka available in Shinbo[1978] 
(p.173). 
Table 3 is the correlation matrix of those series for the periods 1833–1841 and 1842–1850.  
The averages of the correlation coefficients of those two periods were 0.824 and 0.487 respectively.  
Comparing each coefficient with its counterpart in the other period, we find that in 70 out of 78 cases, 
the coefficients decreased in 1842–1850.   Concerning 11, 18 and 15 cases out of 70 cases in which the 
coefficients decreased, the differences are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively
13.  It is certain that the price arbitrage function of the market declined in the period of 
kabu nakama prohibition
14. 
A more direct approach to discriminate the contract enforcement hypothesis from the 
monopoly hypothesis is to focus on the inflation rate.  Not to speak of, the latter predicts that the 
inflation rate would decline, while the former predict that the inflation rate would rise. We regressed 
inflation rate on growth rate of money (MONEY), PROHIB and FAMINE￿.  Inflation rates are 
calculated from the price indices in Edo and Osaka explained above.  The observation years are from 
1831 to 1852. In case we use the average inflation rate in Edo and Osaka, the coefficient of PROHIB is 
positive and significant at 10% level, which is consistent with the contract enforcement hypothesis 
and not consistent with monopoly hypothesis.  In case we use the inflation rate in Edo, that coefficient 
is positive and significant at 5% level.  On the other hand, in the case of Osaka inflation rate, that 
coefficient is positive but not significant.  These results reflect the difference of the two major cities.  
While Edo was characterized as a center of consumption, Osaka was a center of distribution 
(Takeuchi[1969] pp.128-129; Shinbo and Hasegawa[1988] pp.230-231). Therefore, while in Edo the 
disorder of distribution mainly resulted in decline of supply from other areas, in Osaka the disorder of 
distribution brought about decline of supply to other areas as well as decline of supply from other 
                                                                                                                                                                    
using the gold price in Kyoto, which is available in Miyamoto[1981].  We followed Shinbo[1982]. 
13 After doing Z transformation to the correlation coefficients, we assume normal distribution. 
14 Miyamoto[1988] calculated the variation coefficients using the cross section data of rice prices in 
the same thirteen regions to find that the coefficients increased after the 1830s.  He interpreted this as 
suggesting a structural change in the nation wide network of the rice markets.  Although he did not 
mention kabu nakama, this finding is consistent with our hypothesis. 
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hi 
plication of the efficiency wage model of Greif[1993], “sabotage” hypothesis 
cann
h implies that the positive effect of kabu nakama was 
larger than its negative or monopolistic effect.   
5.Con
at a public system of third party contract enforcement is a 
prere
                                                       
.    
Finally, one might wonder that the decline of the economic performance in the period of 
prohibition was due to a “sabotage” by ex kabu nakama merchants to resist the policy of the Bakufu.  
There is no descriptive evidence to support this interpretation.  Also, this hypothesis is not consistent 
with the real wage data.  Saito[1998] shows the real wage of day workers in Edo, construction workers 
in Edo, carpenters in Edo,  carpenters in Kyoto and Osaka, and  soy sauce brewery workers  in Chos
(pp.182-190).  We regressed these real wages from 1830 to 1852 on PROHIB to find that the with 
respect to real wage of construction workers in Edo, carpenters in Kyoto and Osaka, and brewery 
workers in Choshi, the coefficients of PROHIB  are positive and significant (Table5).  While this 
result is a direct im
ot explain it. 
  In this section we have examined the performance of the Japanese economy in the period of 
kabu nakama prohibition, using quantitative data as well as descriptive materials.  All of the results 
indicate that the performance of the economy and market mechanism declined in the period of kabu 
nakama prohibition, compared with the period before it. It is true that kabu nakama had a monopoly 
function as the preceding literature has argued, but those results support our hypothesis that kabu 
nakama played the role of contract enforcement
15.  Also, from Table 2 and Table 4, we can see which 
effect outweighed, the positive one (contract enforcement) or the negative one (monopoly).  The 
contract enforcement hypothesis predicts that prohibition of kabu nakama would result in rise of 
inflation rate and decline of growth rate, while the monopoly hypothesis predicts that it would result in 
decline of inflation rate and rise of growth rate.  As Table 2 and Table 4 indicate, after the ban in 1841, 
inflation rate rose and growth rate declined, whic
   
cluding remarks 
Economic growth started around 1790, before the Meiji Restoration, in Japan.  At the same 
time, Aitai Sumashi Rei, promulgated repeatedly, implies that public third party enforcement of 
contracts did not work well.  In this sense, the pre-modern Japanese economic development provides a 
significant counter-example to the view th
quisite for economic development.   
 
15 To compare the economic performances of the periods before and after kabu nakama was 
established is another important strategy for testing our hypothesis.  The facts that the sustainable 
growth of real money supply started around the Tanuma Period (Section 2), and that the putting-out 
system and the merchandise production began in many cotton-weaving places at about the same time 
(Section 3) are consistent with our hypothesis.   
  15Kabu nakama, a coalition of merchants or artisans, played the role of contract enforcement, 
substituting for the public authority. In other words, the role of kabu nakama was significant, because 
a public system of contract enforcement did not work well.  Many of the codes of kabu nakama 
included articles prescribing that all of the nakama members should suspend trade with a person who 
has cheated one of their own.  It implies that kabu nakama in Edo Era Japan adopted the Multilateral 
Punishment Strategy (MPS), which Greif[1993] formulated concerning the coalition of Maghribis 
traders in medieval Mediterranean society.  As Greif[1993] addressed, the MPS of Maghribis traders 
reduced the incentive for the trade counterpart to cheat, and through it enabled expansion of trade 
under the condition that third party enforcement by the public authority was insufficient.  Kabu 
nakama in Edo Era Japan adopted the MPS not only for ordinary commercial transactions, but also for 
the putting out system and employment, and thereby, it contributed to organizing production as well as 
to exp
d a cheater could hardly find counterparts of trade 
othe




anding commerce.  
In Edo Era Japan, there were conditions which made the MPS by kabu nakama to be an 
equilibrium. The number of the players of the game were limited. Not only the average number of 
nakama was around 30, their transaction counterparts were limited number of brokers, employees and 
subcontractors, which enabled nakama members to monitor the counterparts and identify cheaters.  
Also, kabu nakama had information transmission mechanisms for delivering the information among 
the members. These conditions contributed to lower the probability that a cheater would be rehired.  
On the other hand, an honest counterpart could expect to continue transaction for a long time. Finally, 
the outside options of the transaction counterparts were low, because kabu nakama had the privilege 
to monopolize a certain business in a certain area, an
r than nakama members due to the privilege.   
We empirically examined the hypothesis that kabu nakama had a function of contract 
enforcement, using an opportunity of a natural experiment provided by the prohibition of kabu 
nakama in the Tenpo Reform.  We have historical documents which indicate that the distribution 
system was disordered and the quality of production was in decay during the kabu nakama prohibition. 
Also, quantitative data support the contract enforcement hypothesis. First, growth rate of the real 
money supply declined in the period of kabu nakama prohibition.  Second, the price arbitrage function 
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Figure 2 The Sales of Edo Store of Echigoya Kan
Source:The accounting books of Echigoya (Mokuroku Ginmi Yori) of various years, possesed by the Mitsui 











































































Growth rate of the real money
supply ￿right scale￿
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Figure 4 Growth Rates of the Prices in Edo and Osaka ￿
Source: See the text.table1
Table 1 Correlation coefficients of the growth rates of the rice prices across regions






Note: See the text.table2
Table 2 Influence of the Prohibition of Kabu Nakama on Economic Growth








FAMINE II -0.0302 -0.0304
(-3.088) (-3.327)
adR2 0.435 0.267 0.305
N 2 22 22 2
Note: See the text.
        t-values in parentheses.table3
Table 3-A Correlation Matrix of the Growth Rates of the Regional Rice Prices 1833-1841
Osaka Omi Banshu Fukuchiyam Hiroshima Bocho Saga Kumamoto Edo Nagoya Shinshu Aizu Dewa Average
Osaka 1.000 0.892
Omi 0.969 1.000 0.853
Banshu 0.937 0.909 1.000 0.877
Fukuchiyama 0.974 0.962 0.979 1.000 0.893
Hiroshima 0.976 0.964 0.956 0.973 1.000 0.894
Bocho 0.969 0.910 0.941 0.966 0.951 1.000 0.888
Saga 0.937 0.895 0.977 0.975 0.944 0.952 1.000 0.873
Kumamoto 0.821 0.776 0.911 0.889 0.876 0.875 0.903 1.000 0.815
Edo 0.892 0.940 0.864 0.916 0.886 0.819 0.830 0.777 1.000 0.797
Nagoya 0.992 0.972 0.912 0.961 0.955 0.941 0.909 0.790 0.924 1.000 0.874
Shinshu 0.341 0.123 0.356 0.280 0.336 0.418 0.379 0.481 0.108 0.302 1.000 0.325
Aozu 0.947 0.889 0.900 0.915 0.962 0.951 0.885 0.860 0.811 0.918 0.511 1.000 0.874
Dewa 0.943 0.928 0.879 0.929 0.952 0.960 0.888 0.824 0.800 0.909 0.268 0.941 1.000 0.852
Average 0.824
Note: See the text.
Table 3-B Correlation Matrix of the Growth Rates of the Regional Rice Prices 1842-1850
Osaka Omi Banshu Fukuchiyam Hiroshima Bocho Saga Kumamoto Edo Nagoya Shinshu Aizu Dewa Average
Osaka 1.000 0.642
Omi 0.867 1.000 0.572
Banshu 0.893 0.888 1.000 0.676
Fukuchiyama 0.829 0.807 0.939 1.000 0.659
Hiroshima 0.458 0.259 0.450 0.663 1.000 0.400
Bocho 0.851 0.819 0.924 0.971 0.631 1.000 0.667
Saga 0.603 0.633 0.789 0.912 0.736 0.921 1.000 0.569
Kumamoto 0.702 0.695 0.779 0.832 0.765 0.847 0.874 1.000 0.582
Edo 0.086 -0.212 0.037 -0.014 0.144 -0.044 -0.069 -0.092 1.000 0.001
Nagoya 0.481 0.284 0.274 0.216 0.281 0.316 0.189 0.310 0.646 1.000 0.237
Shinshu 0.624 0.691 0.634 0.430 -0.095 0.532 0.316 0.442 -0.379 0.041 1.000 0.373
Aozu 0.649 0.616 0.763 0.605 0.149 0.567 0.400 0.449 -0.088 -0.100 0.750 1.000 0.468
Dewa 0.656 0.518 0.735 0.719 0.359 0.673 0.524 0.385 -0.003 -0.090 0.494 0.852 1.000 0.485
Average 0.487
Note: See the text.table4
Table 4 Influence of the Prohibition of Kabu Nakama on Inflation Rates
Average of Edo and Osaka Edo  Osaka
Constant -0.1294 -0.1530 -0.1070
(-1.879) (-2.036) (-1.542)
MONEY -1.9670 -3.0540 -0.9640
(-0.361) (-0.514) (-0.176)
PROHIB 0.1059 0.1339 0.0794
(1.872) (2.167) (1.396)
FAMINE II 0.0709 0.0819 0.0605
(3.296) (3.485) (2.799)
adR2 0.277 0.188 0.314
N 2 22 22 2
Note: See the text.
        t-values in parentheses.table5
Table 5 Influence of the Prohibition of Kabu Nakama on Real Wages






Constant 91.454 91.138 96.177 83.238 78.131
(21.200) (20.443) (19.009) (20.899) (40.975)
PROHIB 3.516 12.252 5.593 11.472 21.694
(0.537) (1.812) (0.729) (1.899) (7.502)
adR2 -0.033 0.094 -0.0218 0.106 0.715
N 2 32 3 2 3 2 32 3
Note: See the text.
        t-values in parentheses.
- 1 -